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The island of Hispaniola provides an interesting juxtaposition with regard to 
political and economic progress and inequality in the Caribbean. From colonization 
to independence, through dictatorships and democracies, the island – comprised of 
Haiti to the west and the Dominican Republic (DR) to the east – has been 
transformed throughout the past few hundred years, undergoing numerous political 
and economic upheavals and changes. To borrow Jared Diamond’s chapter title in 
Collapse, Hispaniola truly is “One Island, Two Peoples, Two Histories.”1 
 Haiti and the DR share a similar historical narrative of colonization. Haiti 
grew to be the most wealthy and successful colony in the Caribbean, known as the 
“Crown Jewel” of France’s overseas empire.2 Although the DR did not enjoy an 
equal level of economic success as a colony, it nonetheless experienced periods of 
Spanish colonization and control, in addition to an intermediary Haitian invasion, 
before independence was eventually established.3 Both Haiti and the DR were able 
to achieve independence in the first half of the 19th century, but this posed many 
economic and political challenges. The extractive economies of colonization 
depleted Hispaniola of many resources and the major world trading partners were 
not open to negotiation with these new states.4 Post-colonization, Haiti and the DR 
were left with weak political institutions and they struggled to implement strong, 
stable governments. Each country experienced multiple coups and political 
instability post-independence; authoritarian regimes and dictatorships seemed the 	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 only way to maintain and secure power on the island.5 These authoritarian regimes 
ultimately contributed to limiting overall economic, social, and political growth.  
 With regard to political and economic inequality, the authoritarian and 
economic experiences of Haiti and the DR were relatively similar until the 1980s. 
In this decade, Latin America underwent a drastic transformation as a wave of 
democracy flooded the region: political transfigurations and competitive elections 
swept the hemisphere.6 A massive economic crisis accompanied this democratic 
trend; however, democracy continued to grow in the countries that were willing to 
transform, and the economic downfall had less of a direct impact on these 
transitional states. 7  It was during this period that great divergence occurred 
between the Haitian and DR narratives: the DR took slow steps toward 
democratization and modernization, whereas the Duvalier regime struggled to 
maintain its hold on Haiti until the mid-1980s.  
 Since this shift towards democracy in the mid-1980s, the DR has done a 
much better job than Haiti at achieving economic and political success. Today, 
Haiti is not only the poorest country in the Caribbean, but the poorest country of 
the western hemisphere and one of the poorest countries of the world, ranking 25th 
among the poorest twenty-five world nations.8 The DR, which is considered one of 
the poorer countries of the Caribbean, is performing at an economically higher 
success rate when compared to Haiti; in fact, the World Bank regards DR as an 
upper middle-income level country.9 Therefore, focusing on Haiti and the DR 
makes for a compelling comparison, as over the course of history these two 
countries have essentially switched “success” statuses – from success as a colony 
to struggling for political and economic stability, how is it that one country in 
Hispaniola faces political triumph and the other is experiencing stunted growth? 
 This paper intends to examine why the DR, which has a similar population 
size, geographical landscape, and political history to Haiti, is excelling in the 
political and economic arenas in which Haiti is currently struggling. Is the DR’s 
political and economic success due largely to the sustained experiment with 
democracy and peaceful transfers of power from the 1980s? By using a historical 
case study analysis and gathering modern data, I aim to identify what factors 	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In order to better understand the wave of democracy that hit Latin America in the 
1980s, it is necessary to understand why this form of government was sought after 
and then to evaluate what benefits democratization has for a state, as opposed to 
other methods of governance. The first school of thought identified in this 
literature review, democratization, sheds light on why democracy has become so 
widespread and why the world’s political climate looks favorably upon this 
“universal value.”10 The second school of thought discussed is institution building 
and its effects on political and economic success. Both of these schools of thought 
rely on the theoretical underpinning of institutionalism, namely that the extent of 
inequality in or between nations can be explained as a joint product of internal and 
external forces, and in this case due to the success or failures of democracy and/or 
political institutions. Institution building in Latin America is affected by both 
democratization and colonialism, which leads to the third school of thought 
identified in the literature, colonialism, with particular attention paid to colonialist 
legacies and its effects on political and economic development and 
underdevelopment. The literature also identifies different types of colonialism and 
presents the various challenges the legacy of colonialism poses to democratizing 
and modernizing societies. This school of thought builds upon institutionalism, 
arguing that colonialism has a direct effect on institutional frameworks, but it also 
relies on the theoretical underpinning of modernization, that external forces are 
responsible for contributing positively (or, in absence, negatively) towards internal 
political and economic change. 
Additionally, evidence for a comparative historical case study was gathered 
and analyzed in order to better frame the issues of democratization, colonialism, 
and political and economic inequality in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This is 
presented later in the paper, under “Description of Data.” 
 
Democratization and Institutionalism 
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of democratization, or the 
transitioning to democratic political regimes, and maintaining strong democratic 
governmental institutions to the creation of better political, social, and economic 
equality.11 In “Democracy as a Universal Value,” economist and philosopher 
Amartya Sen traces how the idea of democracy has a universal commitment and is 	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 regarded in the twentieth century as the “default” or best mode of governance.12 
Sen argues that democracy is the ground on which legitimate political institutions 
can form. Sen’s key contribution to the theory of democratization lies in his 
argument that the twentieth century has seen a change in the way theorists view 
democracy: ultimately, instead of states being deemed fit for democracy, states 
become fit through democracy, and democracy is now the sought-after mechanism 
states use to better themselves.13 
Former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) 
expands upon the trend of democratization in Latin America, claiming that the idea 
of democracy has posed one of the largest challenges for the region in the post-
Cold War era.14 As Cardoso explains, there was no space for military dictatorships 
in the changing political arena, and no longer any powerful bloc to support them.15 
Therefore, democratization was essentially inevitable for the region and although 
the transition to democracy was more or less accomplished on a large scale, the 
foundations of democracy – a truly democratic civil culture with political equality 
– was and has not been reinforced. Cardoso highlights the corruption within 
election systems and political parties and the lack of due process of law.16 He states 
that Latin America has “created the infrastructure of democracy, but the soul is 
missing.”17 Cardoso states that the biggest challenge Latin America faces with 
regard to democracy is the fluctuation between institutions and personalism. In 
other words, Cardoso claims that the charismatic nature of “leaders” halts the 
overall process and effectiveness of a true democracy.18 
Cardoso argues that when slow national economic growth occurs, 
democracy itself, not only the economy, is blamed for the failure to respond 
promptly to popular demands.19 However, as Sen suggests, there is “no convincing 
general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and 
civil rights are really beneficial to economic development.”20 Therefore, the type of 
political system does not necessarily equate to economic development and success; 
however, the opportunities for capital investment and large-scale popular 	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 involvement that are found within democracies are considered better mechanisms 
for reducing both political and economic inequality. 
 
Institution Building 
Institutions serve a dual purpose: they have the power to shape governments and in 
turn can be shaped by governments. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James 
Robinson emphasize that the colonial experience is one of the many factors that 
affect the structure and effectiveness of institutions. Likewise, Sen demonstrates 
that democratization is also a factor that shapes which institutions are put into 
place. However, creating new institutions can be seen as an act of proactive 
democratization in itself.21 
Sen argues that by creating new institutions, people have the opportunity to 
exercise their rights more often. Democratic governments and institutions require a 
higher moral ground of operation and are more accepting of greater political 
participation.22 Additionally, the institutions established by democracies allow for 
greater economic growth. Acemoglu et al. argue that present-day countries with 
“better” or more inclusive institutions are more likely to invest in human physical 
capital, which in turn will result in a greater level of national income.23 Dani 
Rodrik, Arvind Subramarian, and Francesco Trebbi agree, and argue that when 
investors believe their property rights are protected, the economy ends up richer.24 
This builds upon Acemoglu et al.’s argument that modern-day extractive states 
face economic hardships as their institutions are designed with little to no property 
rights, whereas neo-European colonies have fared better with the rule of law and 
protection of property instilled in their institutions. Thus, with strong institutions in 
place, it can be expected that the economy will attract more investment and 
experience an increase in growth. This argument – that strong or democratic 
institutions allow for better political and economic equality and growth – is the 
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 fundamental component in evaluating the inequality between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic. 
Acemoglu et al. argue that the extractive institutions set up by colonialists 
have persisted long after the respective colonial regimes ended. Citing the work of 
Crawford Young, the authors explain that these newly independent post-colonial 
states are the successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, practices, 
and hidden theories of governance.25 It is this institutional legacy that has impeded 
economic progress and growth in modern colonies-turned-states. Thus, the authors 
argue that improving the institutions in former extractive-state colonies could make 
substantial economic gains.26 
 Rodrik et al. take a different view regarding the primacy of institutions. In 
“Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in 
Economic Development,” the authors identify the three common explanations that 
explain the gap between rich countries and poor countries: (1) geography, (2) 
participation in international trade, and (3) the establishment of effective 
government institutions. Rodrik et al. strongly critique the work of Acemoglu et al. 
and argue that the importance of institutions does not imply policy 
ineffectiveness.27 Essentially, the authors are arguing that policy innovations can 
provide fundamental changes to the economy without affecting the institutional 
structure in place. However, Rodrik et al. do agree that institutions have the power 
to effect economic development but they do not do so independently: a 
combination of factors is responsible for the varying income levels seen 
worldwide. 
 Jared Diamond agrees with Rodrik et al. that multiple and diverse factors 
explain why nations differ in wealth. In “What Makes Countries Rich or Poor?” 
Diamond critiques the work of Acemoglu et al. and argues that alongside 
institution building, the geography of a state should be considered as a factor 
impacting power, prosperity, and poverty in a country.28 Diamond suggests that 
Rodrik et al. make a valid argument that politics and political institutions 
determine what economic institution the country will have, but also notes that the 
challenges geography poses complicates this process. For example, countries that 
rely on tropical agricultural productivity are limited by their geography, climate, 
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 and biology with regard to economic output.29 These limitations will directly 
impact whatever economic system is put into place, and while scholars look at 
institution building from a top-down approach, Diamond’s example shows 
institution building from a bottom-up theory. Ultimately, Diamond is arguing that 
if a political institution wishes to change its economy by changing the main exports 




In “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development,” Acemoglu et al. argue 
that the contemporary gap between rich and poor nations can be traced to the age 
of colonization. More specifically, the authors claim that present-day inequality is 
related to the type of colonial state that was initially established by the colonizing 
European powers.30 Acemoglu et al. suggest that two different kinds of colonies 
were established by Europeans: the first, the “extractive state,” used by European 
colonists whose aim was to transfer as many resources and wealth as possible back 
home to the imperial crown; the second, the “neo-European” colonies, used by 
European colonists for settler purposes, with the goal of replicating European 
institutions abroad. Extractive state colonies did not allow for the protection of 
private property nor did they provide checks and balances against government 
expropriation, while neo-European colonies emphasized property rights and were 
designed to institutionally place a check against government power.31 Most of the 
colonial experience in Latin America followed the extractive model, especially 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Spanish colonization had 
the goal of obtaining as much gold and other valuables as possible from the 
Americas. Acemoglu et al. argue that extractive states, focused on transferring 
resources quickly to the metropole, had an institutional design that was detrimental 
to investment and economic progress.32 
Similarly, Andrew Gunder Frank suggests that the world’s current 
struggling, underdeveloped nations are the ones who have had close ties to colonial 
metropolises in the past.33 In “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Frank 
argues the underlying cause of underdevelopment is that great colonial powers 
became wealthy at the expense of the colonies they exploited and that these same 	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 powers continue to exploit the colonies post-independence.34 Frank believes that a 
historical approach to the problems of development and underdevelopment shows 
that contemporary underdevelopment is “in large part the historical product of past 
and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped 
and the now developed metropolitan countries.” 35  These metropolis-satellite 
relations continue to affect the economic, social, and political life of Latin 
American colonies and countries.  
 
Development and Underdevelopment  
In “Development: Which Way Now,” Amartya Sen addresses how development 
economics play an important role in underdeveloped and developing countries. Sen 
argues that economic growth is not the same as economic development, and the 
reason economic development is slow in developing countries is due to a lack of 
planning and state activism.36 Additionally, low growth can be attributed to a 
failure of labor mobilization as well as capital accumulation. To combat this, a 
strong government or institutional framework is needed to bolster economic 
progress. Sen argues, “the point is not so much that the government is powerful in 
the high-growth developing countries. It is powerful in nearly every developing 
country. The issue concerns the systemic involvement of the state in the economic 
sphere, and the pursuit of planned economic development.”37 Ultimately, Sen 
argues, government involvement in fostering economic growth and encouraging 
industrialization, which is easier to obtain due to the abundance of this already-
existing technology, can greatly improve underemployment and low growth in 
developing countries.38 
In “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Frank argues that 
underdevelopment is not due to the survival of “archaic” and ineffective 
institutions or the existence of capitalism in privileged regions, but rather 
underdevelopment is and continues to be generated by the development of 
capitalism and the continuous cycle of metropolis-satellite relations, supported by 
dependency theory.39 Frank argues that the expansion of capitalism has penetrated 
even the most isolated corners of the world, meaning that the current institutions 
and examples of global inequality cannot claim to be “behind” in terms of 
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 knowledge or access to some sort of capital economic system. 40  Therefore, 
underdevelopment of a region cannot simply be due to its isolation from the world 
market and its pre-capital institutions. 
Additionally, Frank argues that the cycle of metropolis-satellite relations 
repeats itself, but only when convenient for the metropolis. Essentially, Frank 
argues that satellites will experience the most economic growth and classic 
capitalist industrial development when their ties to a metropolis are weak, or when 
the state is left to its own devices.41 This argument counters widely accepted 
scholarship that claims contact with developed nations will actually help 
underdeveloped nations grow. Frank’s article suggests that underdeveloped 
nations, which he presumes have contact with capitalism, will increase their own 
development if they move beyond the legacy of colonialism and the metropolis-
satellite cycle and place all surplus capital in the world market, effectively 
breaking away from economy-sucking metropolis powerhouses.42 
Cardoso agrees with Frank that capitalism has affected most regions of the 
world, arguing that its growth in Latin America is due to the globalization trend of 
democracy and capitalism in the 1980s and post-Cold War era. Ideas about 
capitalism and competing in the global market affected the political makeup of 
each Latin American country, as the states with better institutions that observed 
contracts and the rule of law were able to attract more investment of international 
capital.43 However, not all countries in the region had the necessary conditions to 
join the new world order. Cardoso argues that the countries that lack a diversified 
economy experience greater difficulty in adjusting to the ideas and pressures of 
world capitalism, which can explain the greater economic inequality between 
states.  
When slow growth occurs, Cardoso argues, democracy itself, not only the 
economy, is blamed for the failure to respond promptly to popular demands.44 
However, as Sen notes, there is “no convincing general evidence that authoritarian 
governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to 
economic development.”45 Therefore, the type of political system in place does not 
necessarily translate into economic development and success; however, the 
opportunities for capital investment and large-scale popular involvement that are 
found within democracies are considered better mechanisms for reducing 
inequality. 	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The existing literature regarding democratization, the primacy of institutions, and 
the effects of colonialism on development demonstrate how present-day inequality 
cannot simply be explained as a matter of democratic transformation or colonial 
legacy. The literature highlights that a number of variables, working collectively 
together, explain why developing countries experience differing levels of political 
and economic inequality. Thus, the variables this paper intends to research are 
democracy, institutions, and the colonial legacies left in Haiti and the DR. 
The theoretical underpinnings of institutionalism and modernization best fit 
the scope of my paper. This paper hypothesizes that external forces, such as the 
wave and implementation of democracy and democratic institutions, and the end of 
colonialism, coupled with the emergence of a global capitalist market, have 
contributed to the political and economic disparities between the nations of Haiti 
and the DR. More specifically, this paper hypothesizes that the legacy of extractive 
state colonialism explains why Haiti and the DR have experienced similar 
difficulties in creating stable institutions and economies. However, Amartya Sen’s 
idea that “a country does not have to be fit for democracy, but becomes fit through 
democracy” lays the central foundation for my argument. This essay hypothesizes 
that Haiti’s poor economy and lack of political and economic growth is due to the 
government’s failure to adopt and implement democracy and its inability to 
maintain strong government institutions. Additionally, I argue that the Dominican 
Republic’s willingness to adopt democratic values is key to why the eastern-most 
part of Hispaniola experiences stronger political institutions, better economic 
growth, and less overall political and economic inequality. In addition, I will show 
that the roles of democracy and institutions are at the heart of why such inequality 
exists in Hispaniola. 
 
Sources of Data 
 
For my research, I use a historical case study analysis of Haiti and the DR. I rely 
heavily on the qualitative and descriptive data presented in Howard Wiarda and 
Harvey Kline’s seventh-edition Latin American Politics and Development. In 
particular, I draw on Esther Skelley Jordan and Georges A. Fauriol accounts of the 
historical backgrounds of the DR and Haiti respectively, while also analyzing their 
current stance with regard to political and economic development. I supplement 
these historical accounts with additional scholarly articles from the social sciences 
that retrace the political histories of both countries. While this research is mostly 
focused on analyzing descriptive data and providing explanations, it also 
 references statistical data provided from the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
Defining the Variables  
 
Democracy - Democracy is used as a tool to measure both political and economic 
inequality in Haiti and the DR. With regard to measuring strictly political 
inequality, democracy is evaluated by the methods undergone to adopt 
democratization, taking account of the year and process of democratization, and 
factoring in the general reception of democracy by each state. Elections, 
presidencies, and political participation are a few components I am looking for in 
order to detect how democratic the states have become. 
 
Institution Building - More broadly, institution building is measured by the 
longevity, authority, and legitimacy of institutions put in place post-colonialism. 
This includes various regime changes and institutional upheavals, and will account 
for the change in institution building after democratization is introduced to both 
Haiti and the DR. Institution building will account for both political and economic 
institutions, should they exist in both Haiti and the DR. 
 
Colonialism - Colonialism is measured by examining each state’s historical 
experience with European colonizing powers. It is then evaluated by whether an 
extractive or neo-European state was established and is traced to see how and if the 
mode of colonialism affects modern institutions, economics, and politics today. 
This variable will account for the goods and services exchanged under colonialism 
and seek to find similar economic patterns in present-day Haiti and the DR.  
 
Description of Data 
 
Hispaniola 
The island of Hispaniola, discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1492, was 
originally founded as a Spanish colony and was consequently designed as an 
“extractive state”.46 Spain’s colonial mission was to gather as much gold and 
valuables as possible from the Americas and to bring the wealth back to Europe to 
support the crown.47 The diseases brought by the Spanish wiped out a large number 
of the island’s indigenous populations, and slave labor was brought in from Africa 
in order to continue the mining and extraction economy the colonists had in 	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 place.48 Soon, the Spanish became uninterested in Hispaniola as the extractive 
minerals were depleting, which caused a scramble for power among other 
colonizing powers for control of the island: ultimately, the French gained control 
of the western part of Hispaniola, which came to be Haiti in 1697, and the two 
European powers redrew political and socio-geographical lines on the island. 
 
Haiti 
Haiti emerged as an independent nation in 1804 and was the first of its kind to 
break away from slavery and colonial rule in the Caribbean. Once known as the 
“crown jewel” of France’s overseas empire, the newly independent nation suffered 
from a ruined economy with no international network or allies to provide economic 
support. Haiti experienced post-colonial instability in numerous ways: a strong 
mistrust of whites and foreign alliances circulated through Haitian society, and 
racial prejudice and ethnic cleansing turned compatriots against each other; the 
economy, reliant on agriculture and subsistence farming, faced environmental, 
ecological, and political endangerment, especially as it struggled to modernize, 
democratize, and enter the world marketplace; and the country received little 
foreign investment to support its economy and government.49 
Since its early independence, Haiti has struggled to establish political and 
economic stability. The country has had powerful authoritarian personalities and 
regimes in power for over one hundred and fifty years. Haiti has experienced 
military coups, “emperors,” countless presidents, authoritarian dictatorships (i.e., 
the Duvalier era), and most recently the controversial Aristide presidency. The 
institutions implemented throughout each of these governments were extremely 
weak, as they were continuously changed and bent to the will of the elites in 
power. These institutions and dictatorships stifled economic growth and minimized 
political participation and equality. 
As the third wave of democracy hit Latin America in the 1980s, Haiti 
remained under the Duvalier dictatorship, under “Baby Doc” Jean-Claude 
Duvalier, who had been in power since 1971 as the successor to his father’s brutal 
regime.50 Previously, “Papa Doc” Duvalier had brutally oppressed all opposition, 
limiting all political participation and personal freedoms in Haiti. Baby Doc 
continued many of the same oppressive traditions, but during most of his reign 
Haiti was less violent. After the Pope visited Haiti in 1983 and called for political, 
economic, and social reforms, widespread discontent spread throughout the 	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 country, putting pressure on the administration. Revolts and protests broke out 
throughout Haiti, which eventually led to Duvalier’s exile.51 Haiti then tried to hold 
democratic elections, as democracy was sweeping Latin America, but the attempts 
proved to be corrupt and short-lived. 
Aristide, the first president of Haiti to be “democratically” elected in 1990, 
exemplifies the difficulties Haiti faces with democratization and the stabilization of 
institutions. Aristide was overthrown by a coup after eight months and replaced 
with periods of military power until his reinstatement in 1994. Political, economic, 
and social inequality increased in the state during this unstable period.52 The 
United States and its Haitian allies attempted coups d’état on several occasions in 
efforts to reinstate democracy, but by doing so, the existing political and economic 
institutions further crumbled, and new institutions put in place by the US, UN, or 
Haitian elites lacked legitimacy, stability, and majority approval.53 The United 
States, which has a much-involved imperial and foreign policy in Haiti, has 
attempted to reinstate democratic systems and values by dismantling old 
legislatures and institutions and forming US-approved mechanisms. However, as 
Roger Annis and Kim Ives explain, by doing so the US has destroyed what little 
remains of Haitian democracy and sovereignty, especially since the country 
appears unable to rebuild its physical, political, and economic infrastructure on its 
own.54 
Haiti has attempted to overcome repression and has tried to hold free and 
fair elections since the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, but however 
valiant the country’s efforts, Haiti cannot seem to shake off its unstable past. As 
Annis and Ives explain, even the more recent 2010 general election was plagued by 
widespread fraud, manipulation, and disenfranchisement. Thus, Haiti continues to 
experience instability, continuing the trend of military coups and political 
inequality.55 The current prime minister, as of December 13, 2014, has resigned his 
position due to the political unrest in Haiti. With elections being overdue, 
corruption in government, and political protesting, this resignation was an attempt 
to make a comment on the political crises Haiti continues to face.56 Although 
“Haiti is far from the hell that it was under the Duvalier dynasty (1957-86) and the 
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 murderous military regime of coup leaders Raoul Cédras and Michel François 
(1991-94),”57 it still has a long way to go to reach political and economic stability. 
Haiti, regardless of its many efforts and attempts throughout the years, has 
essentially failed at “fair and free” democratization. This failure to democratize 
and to establish stable institutions has directly impacted the Haitian economy, 
which relies heavily on foreign aid, especially from the United States.58 Haiti owns 
0% of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) regional 
market.59 The World Bank classifies Haiti as a low-income level country, accruing 
$8.459 billion GDP annually, and with a GNI per capita of $810 (2013).60 This is 
significant poverty, as Haiti has a population of 10.32 million people61 – about 
equal in population size to its neighbor, the DR, only with one-half of the 
geographical space.62 Currently, 58.5% of the Haitian population lives at or below 
the poverty line, with a life expectancy of 63 years.63 As a low-income country 
faced with such inequality, remittances have become the steadiest source of 
income.64 
 In addition to its weak political institutions and struggles adopting 
democracy, Haiti has a crippled economic sector. The geographical location of 
Haiti makes it one of the most disaster-prone areas in the world, and the costs 
associated with the frequent recurrence of natural disasters are high. The effects of 
natural disasters limit whatever growth, debt, and progress the state has made, but 
because of its debt, low levels of export, and economic output, there seems little 




The Dominican Republic achieved its colonial independence from Spain in 1821; 
however, it was ruled by Haiti until 1844.65 From 1844 until 1930, the DR 	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 experienced an internal war, foreign intervention and invasion, and bouts of 
military coups and authoritarian dictatorships.66 Although the nation has been 
marked by violence, its viable sugar industry became the cornerstone of 
Dominican society and its post-colonial economic foundation. 
In 1930, Rafael Leonidis Trujillo Molina overthrew the DR’s unstable 
government and restored the economy, but at the expense of democracy and human 
rights. Trujillo was known for brutally oppressing all political opposition and 
critics, yet he managed to bring industrialization to the country and promoted the 
DR’s sugar industry, to the state’s benefit.67 His institutions were able to repay all 
DR foreign debt, but at the expense of its people: poverty was widespread and 
political inequality was abundantly obvious.68 Due to this oppression and Trujillo’s 
plans to kidnap and assassinate other leaders and critics in power, the elites in DR 
society, supported by the US, carried out Trujillo’s assassination in 1961. The next 
few years were plagued by another military coup, a battle between Joaquin 
Balaguer and Juan Bosch for power, and another US invasion (inspired by Cold 
War politics) to ensure that the DR would pursue democracy and avoid becoming a 
socialist state. 
As the 1980s’ wave of democratization spread to Hispaniola, the DR 
responded effectively. The first two presidencies of the era stifled political and 
economic growth, and were faced with mass protest. Consequently, Balaguer was 
re-elected to power in 1986, where he focused his regime on establishing stability 
and promoting modernization.69 According to Samuel Martinez, the change in state 
governance, specifically the shift from a weak institution to a stronger central 
government, explains the shift towards economic success in the DR.70 The DR 
restructured its government to have strong legislative and judicial branches to 
balance the executive, which still struggles to adhere to democratic values. 
However, all components of government have been working together more 
effectively since the wave of democratization to produce better domestic and 
economic policies. Martinez argues that after the age of democratization, the DR 
state began to strengthen and grow internally and thus it was able to exert its 
influence on the economic sector by impacting the elites in charge of sugar 
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 production.71 The sugar-dependent economy grew in the 1990s and gave way to a 
sustained average growth of over seven percent.72 
During the 2000s, the DR had peaceful elections and exchanges of power. 
This stabilization, coupled with an increase in GDP ($36.7 billion GDP, more than 
triple that of the early 1980s) resulted in a more economically content, politically 
active DR. The economy continues to become more diversified, as the DR is 
moving away from the agricultural sector and relies more on US foreign 
investment, the United States being one its strongest trading partners in the 
Caribbean.73 Slowly, the DR has emerged in the global marketplace. With a 
population of 10.4 million (2013), a GNI per capita of $5,260, and a GDP of 
$60.61 billion, the Dominican Republic is now classified as an upper middle-
income level country. 74  Although the economy has progressed since 
democratization, economic inequality does still exist inside the DR. 40% of the 
population live at or below the poverty line and the life expectancy is estimated at 
73 years.75 
 
Discussion of Hypothesized Relationships in Light of Data 
 
Haiti and the DR have similar colonial histories. The island of Hispaniola was 
institutionally set up by the Spanish to extract as many resources as possible from 
the Americas, in order to increase Spanish wealth and influence back home.76 This 
extractive state established by the Spanish, and echoed by the French, set up the 
island and its two countries for failure, as the colonial design did not allow for 
strong institutions, political participation, or economic growth and independence.  
Post-independence, Haiti and the DR were affected by similar political 
trends. Both countries were shaped by dictatorships that weakened social 
institutions, stifled growth, and required outside military involvement (US in the 
Cold War) to either intervene or impose ideals upon state governance and politics. 
However, the wave of democracy in Latin America during the 1980s proved to be 
the divergent point for Haiti and the DR. Haiti, under strict authoritarian rule until 
the mid-1980s, resisted external and internal pressure to democratize. The DR was 
able to successfully, although slowly, adapt democratic ideals and values and 
implement them in Dominican society throughout the latter half of the 1900s, and 
were able to best exemplify these ideals into the 2000s. 	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Relating to the Literature  
The DR has achieved better economic and political success due to the efforts made 
by the state to become “fit through democracy.”77 Their slow, albeit imperfect, 
attempts at democratization explain why the country has been more stable and has 
better economic success. Additionally, due to the DR implementing better 
institutional reform, more people are able to take part in the political process. As 
Mainwaring and Scully explain, “effective states are important for successful 
democratic governance. Without an effective state, neither democracy nor 
development will flourish.”78 This supports Sen’s arguments that creating new 
institutions give people the opportunity to exercise their rights more often, thus 
creating a more content democratic society. 79  This also correlates with the 
institutional arguments made by Rodrik and Subramanian.  
The DR serves as both an example and an exception to the theory of 
colonialism and comparative development, as put forth by Acemoglu et al. The 
authors essentially argue that former “extractive state” colonies, such as the DR 
and Haiti, had a built-in disadvantage, as the legacy of colonization set the 
foundation for weak political institutions and improper mechanisms to promote 
economic growth in both nations.80 The historical case studies of both Haiti and the 
DR adhere to this theory, as each country struggled to establish legitimate, stable, 
and long-lasting institutions to govern post-independence. This colonial legacy of 
the extractive state made military coups and dictatorships more likely in 
Hispaniola, and can partly explain why both Caribbean countries struggled to excel 
economically after independence. However, Acemoglu et al. also argue that 
present-day countries with better institutions are more likely to invest in human 
physical capital, which in turn will result in a greater level of national income.81 
This argument favors the DR and their institution building, specifically their ability 
to adopt and sustain a democracy, and explains why the DR is achieving a much 
greater level of income and more investments in its human and physical capital 
than Haiti. 
Refuting the theory of dependency and suggesting the cycle of 
underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank argued that satellites experience the most 
economic growth and classic capitalist industrial development when their ties to a 
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 metropolis are weak.82 This argument counters scholarship which claims that 
contact with developed nations will help underdeveloped nations grow. This case 
study of Hispaniola disproved Frank’s findings: through democratization, adopting 
capitalist policies, and engaging in trade relations with major metropolises (e.g., 
the US), the DR is experiencing much more economic growth as it strengthens its 
ties with countries in the international marketplace.83 It is specifically the contact 
with developed nations that is contributing to the DR’s success, which contradicts 
Frank’s argument. Additionally, Haiti is experiencing a reverse trend in economic 
growth, with lower projected annual GDP rates for the next year84, and it has weak 
economic ties with major metropolises, due to simply being a recipient of aid. This 
further disproves Frank’s theories of developing underdevelopment. 
Ultimately, this combination of sustained democracy, stronger institutions, 
and a favorable international market climate for DR’s main products plays an 
important role in why the DR is performing better than Haiti and is experiencing 
less political and economic inequality on the island of Hispaniola. Since the wave 
of democracy in Latin American in the mid-1980s, the DR has done a much better 
job than Haiti largely due to a sustained effort of democratizing and changing its 
economic landscape to fit the world market. The World Bank anticipates a decline 
in Haiti’s GDP for the next year, whereas it predicts an increase in GDP for the 
DR. 85  Therefore, due to the uneasy relationship with the country’s political 
behavior and economic performance, it seems clear that Haiti will not experience a 
lessening gap in inequality until stable democratic governance becomes 
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